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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 






MILL BRIDGE V, INC., as successor to VAN DER MOOLEN OPTIONS USA, 
LLC c/o VAN DER MOOLEN SPECIALISTS, LLC, 




I. ISABELLE BENTON; BENTON PARTNERS II, LLP; JAMES KENKELEN, a 
transferee; EILEEN WHITE, a transferee 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-08-cv-02806 
District Judge: The Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 13, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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 Mill Bridge V, Inc. (“Mill Bridge”)1 filed suit against Defendants I. Isabelle 
Benton, Benton Partners II, LLP, James Kenkelen, and Eileen White (collectively, 
“Benton Partners”), for allegedly failing to disclose material non-public 
information about Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc. (“PHLX”) before Benton 
Partners purchased Mill Bridge’s shares in PHLX.  Mill Bridge appeals from three 
orders from the District Court:  (1) denying Mill Bridge additional discovery; (2) 
denying Mill Bridge a third opportunity to amend its complaint; and (3) granting 




 In late 2004, Mill Bridge sought to liquidate its shares in PHLX.  Mill 
Bridge specifically sought to sell its shares by December 31, 2004, in order to 
recognize a tax loss by the year’s end.  Mill Bridge approached PHLX to inquire 
about potential purchasers; PHLX informed Mill Bridge that Benton, a member of 
PHLX’s Board of Directors, had recently expressed interest in purchasing 
additional shares of PHLX stock.   
                                                 
1 Mill Bridge brings suit as the successor in interest to Van Der Moolen Options 
USA, LLC, c/o Van Der Moolen Specialists, LLC. 
 
2 Because Mill Bridge’s complaint raised a federal question, the District Court had 
subject matter jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 On December 6, 2004, Mill Bridge contacted Benton to determine whether 
Benton Partners would be interested in immediately purchasing its shares in 
PHLX.  Between December 7, 2004 and December 9, 2004, Mill Bridge and 
Benton Partners negotiated a price for the transaction.  During these negotiations, 
Benton Partners did not disclose that PHLX was involved in merger negotiations 
with Archipelago Holdings, Inc. (“Arca”).  On December 9, 2004, the parties 
reached an agreement whereby Mill Bridge would sell its 600 shares in PHLX to 
Benton Partners for $78,000, or $130 per share. 
 Unbeknownst to Mill Bridge, in November 2004, PHLX became aware that 
Arca was potentially interested in a merger.  Near the end of November 2004, 
PHLX contacted Richard Breeden, a member of Arca’s Board of Directors, to 
determine the extent of Arca’s interest.  Breeden spoke with Arca management and 
at some point between November 2004 and December 2004, Breeden informed 
PHLX that Arca was willing to begin merger negotiations. 
 Arca and PHLX began preliminary merger discussions over the telephone, 
focusing on general details about PHLX’s business.  On December 3, 2004, Arca 
and PHLX entered into a confidentiality agreement, whereby the parties agreed to 
keep confidential all non-public information divulged by the other party.  As of 
December 9, 2004, when Mill Bridge sold its shares to Benton Partners, Arca had 
not conducted its official due diligence session with PHLX, which occured “in the 
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middle of December.”  App’x 8.  On December 15, 2004, after the Mill Bridge-
Benton Partners transaction was already finalized, PHLX’s Board of Directors was 
finally informed of the possibility of a merger with Arca.   
The merger negotiations began in full in 2005.  In February 2005, PHLX 
formed a strategic committee to conduct negotiations.  On April 18, 2005, Arca 
offered to purchase all of PHLX’s stock for $50 million, at a price of 
approximately $900 per share—significantly higher than the price paid by Benton 
Partners for Mill Bridges’ shares.  PHLX rejected this offer.  No merger ever took 
place. 
On June 16, 2008, Mill Bridge filed suit in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania alleging, inter alia, that Benton Partners had violated § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, et seq., had 
violated Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and had exercised control person 
liability under § 20 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t.  Specifically, they 
argued that, even though no merger ever took place, the ongoing merger 
negotiations between PHLX and Arca was material non-public information that 
would have affected the market value of Mill Bridge’s shares in PHLX.  That is, 
Mill Bridge argued that it would have negotiated a higher price for its shares in 
PHLX if it was aware of the negotiations.   
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After a lengthy procedural history during which Mill Bridge twice amended 
its complaint, discovery was set to close on June 15, 2010.  Mill Bridge 
successfully petitioned the court to extend the close of discovery until July 15, 
2010.  On July 15, 2010, Mill Bridge again sought to extend the close of discovery.  
On July 28, 2010, the District Court denied this request. 
Meanwhile, on July 16, 2010, Benton Partners filed a motion for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted Mill Bridge several extensions of time in 
which to respond to the motion.  On August 13, 2010, when its response was due, 
Mill Bridge filed a motion to amend its complaint a third time, in order:  (1) to add 
state law claims; (2) to change the date of the stock sale between itself and Benton 
Partners from December 1-2 to December 7-9, 2004; (3) to “sharpen the details” 
about the negotiations between Arca and PHLX; and (4) to include more 
allegations about Benton Partners’ knowledge.  On August 23, 2010, the District 
Court denied this request, concluding that Mill Bridge had not sufficiently justified 
the need for such a late amendment in the face of the undue burden that Mill 
Bridge’s delay would place on the court. 
The same day that Mill Bridge moved to amend its complaint, it filed 
another motion for an extension of time in which to respond to Benton Partners’ 
motion for summary judgment.  The court granted this motion.  Finally, on August 
30, 2010, Mill Bridge filed its response to the pending summary judgment motion. 
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On December 21, 2010, the District Court granted Benton Partners’ motion 
for summary judgment.  The court concluded that Mill Bridge had failed to show 
both that the alleged failure to disclose the potential merger was “material” within 
the meaning of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and that Benton Partners knew this 
allegedly material information at the time of the purchase.  Because the court 
dismissed Mill Bridge’s claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it also concluded 
that Benton Partners could not be subject to control person liability under § 20.  
Mill Bridge timely appealed.   
II. 
 Mill Bridge appeals, in part, from the District Court’s orders denying it the 
opportunity to conduct additional discovery, and to file a third amended 
complaint.3
                                                 
3 Benton Partners has separately moved to limit the portion of Mill Bridge’s appeal 
concerning the District Court’s July 28, 2010 order denying Mill Bridge’s request 
to extend the discovery deadline.  Benton Partners notes that Mill Bridge’s notice 
of appeal only specified that it was appealing from (1) the court’s August 23, 2010 
order denying Mill Bridge’s request to amend its complaint; and (2) the court’s 
December 21, 2010 order granting Benton Partners’ motion for summary 
judgment.  As Mill Bridge notes, however, we may exercise jurisdiction over 
orders not specifically identified in a notice of appeal where there is some 
“connection between the specified and unspecified orders[.]”  Sulima v. Tobyhanna 
Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, Mill Bridge claims that the 
same evidence disclosed at the close of discovery that motivated its attempt to 
amend its complaint justified its request for additional discovery.  Under these 
particular facts, we will permit Mill Bridge to contest the District Court’s July 28, 
2010 order, even though it did not identify that order in its notice of appeal.  We 
will therefore deny Benton Partners’ motion to dismiss and limit this appeal. 
  We review both of these orders for an abuse of discretion.  See Mass. 
7 
 
Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Assoc., 107 F.3d 1026, 1032 (3d Cir. 
1997) (concerning a motion for additional discovery); Cureton v. NCAA, 252 F.3d 
267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001) (concerning a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint).  Mill Bridge also appeals from the District Court’s order granting 
Benton Partners’ motion for summary judgment.  We review de novo, applying the 
same legal standard as the District Court.  See Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 
174 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 First, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mill Bridge 
the opportunity to conduct additional discovery.  Mill Bridge had a long period of 
time in which to conduct discovery.  It chose, for its own reasons, to wait until the 
end of the discovery period to begin to request documents and conduct depositions.  
Moreover, the District Court previously did grant Mill Bridge additional time for 
discovery.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion, given Mill Bridge’s lack 
of diligence during discovery, and given that Mill Bridge had access to discovery 
and trial testimony from a related case arising out of the same incident.   
 Second, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mill 
Bridge the opportunity to amend its complaint for the third time.  Delay in seeking 
to amend a complaint “may become undue when a movant has had previous 
opportunities to amend a complaint.”  Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273 (citation omitted).  
The District Court did not err when it concluded that the delay here was undue.  
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Mill Bridge had already amended its complaint twice, and did not persuasively 
explain why it could not have sought to amend its complaint any earlier.4
 Finally, we agree with the District Court that the record before the District 
Court demonstrated as a matter of law that the merger negotiations between Arca 
and PHLX had not yet become material under the Supreme Court’s test  set forth in 
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 (1988).
   
5
                                                 
4 Although Mill Bridge now offers several reasons purportedly justifying its 
motion to amend, it presented the District Court with fewer and less convincing 
reasons, and included no details about the evidence it allegedly discovered.  As 
Benton notes, this court will not reverse a district court’s decision to deny leave to 
amend on a ground never presented to the district court.  See Lloyd v. HOVENSA, 
LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2004). 
  On December 9, 2004, when 
Mill Bridge and Benton Partners agreed to the stock sale, the negotiations between 
 
5 Benton Partners has moved to strike certain documents from the appendix on the 
basis that those documents were never filed before the District Court.  Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 10(a) defines the documents that are part of the record, and 
Rule 30(b) governs what documents can be included in an appendix.  We agree 
with Benton Partners that the documents highlighted in its motion, spanning App’x 
301-09, 314-15, 317, 319-22, 324-26, 330-34, 336-45, 347-63, 368-69, and 371-73 
are not part of the record under Rule 10(a), and thus should not have been included 
in the appendix for our consideration.   
We have recognized that in limited circumstances, we may have the 
equitable power under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) to allow a party 
to supplement the record with documents that were not presented to the District 
Court.  See In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s Application for Access to Sealed 
Transcripts, 913 F.2d 89, 97 (3d Cir. 1990).  Even if such a power did exist, equity 
would not permit supplementing the record in this instance, where Mill Bridge has 
failed to justify its failure to place these documents into the record before the 
District Court.  Consequently, we will grant Benton Partners’ motion to strike 
documents from the appendix.  We nonetheless note that even if we considered 
these additional documents, we would reach the same result. 
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Arca and PHLX were only in their infancy.  No reasonable juror could conclude 
otherwise.  The evidence raised by Mill Bridge is insufficient to create a genuine 
issue of fact on this issue.  The fact that a confidentiality agreement had been 
signed does not necessarily imply that the negotiations had progressed to the point 
where they were necessarily material—as the District Court noted, such 
agreements are “often entered into at the outset of the [merger] process before any 
material terms are negotiated.”  App’x 35 (emphasis in original).6
 Further, we agree with the District Court that Mill Bridge has failed to show 
that Benton Partners knew of the ongoing merger negotiations at the time of the 
stock sale.  The record suggests that the negotiations were announced to the Board 
of Directors on December 15, 2004, after Mill Bridge had agreed to the sale.  We 
agree with the District Court that Mill Bridge’s evidence, which consists primarily 
of some scattered inconsistencies and ambiguities in deposition transcripts, is 
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to Benton Partners’ knowledge. 
  Because the 
merger negotiations were still in their infancy, the fact of the negotiations does not 
constitute material information that Benton Partners was required to disclose prior 
to their transaction with Mill Bridge. 
                                                 
6 Mill Bridge argues that various portions of deposition testimony are sufficient to 
raise a genuine issue of fact on the materiality of the merger negotiations.  For the 
reasons outlined in the District Court’s opinion, we agree that these efforts are 
unavailing.  See App’x 27-35. 
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 Because we conclude that Mill Bridge has failed to raise a genuine issue of 
fact as to whether Benton Partners failed to disclose material non-public 
information, or whether it knew of such information, we agree with the District 
Court that Mill Bridge’s claims under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 fail as a matter of 
law.  Further, because Mill Bridge has failed to assert “an independent violation of 
the federal securities laws,” it cannot succeed on a claim for control person liability 
under § 20(a).  See In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Secs. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 
211 (3d Cir. 2002).  Consequently, we will affirm the District Court’s order 
granting Benton Partners’ motion for summary judgment. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
